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INTRODUCTION

Of the many contributions that Dean Soia Mentschikoff made
to the educational process at the University of Miami School of
Law, one of the most significant was the introduction of the course
Elements of the Law into the required curriculum. This course,
originally structured at the University of Chicago by her late husband and noted legal scholar Karl Llewellyn, and later taught at
that institution by then-Professor Mentschikoff, provides the intellectual framework for legal education at the University of Miami.
Elements guides the first semester law student through the basics
of legal reasoning by exploring the legal system-in particular, the
relationship of rights, remedies and procedure, the development of
law by decision, and the role of the courts and of counsel.
Each professor who teaches Elements develops his own technique for teaching course materials, although each uses Socratic
dialogue almost exclusively. My own method adapts the familiar
moot court problem to the large class setting, with good effect. I
was invited to share this technique as a part of a festschrift for
Soia Mentschikoff, and I am honored to accept the invitation.
This article begins with a description of Elements, and follows
*

The author wishes to thank his colleagues, Patrick 0. Gudridge and Irwin P. Stotzky,

for their contributions to this article.
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with a discussion of its place within the history and goals of legal
education. I conclude by sharing my moot-court variation of the
Elements course and by discussing how this method better leads
students to a basic understanding of the legal system, the structure
of legal analysis, and the craft of lawyering than does mere Socratic dialogue.

II.

Elements of the Law
A first year student's introduction to Elements at Miami begins with a brief entry in the course bulletin:
THE COURSE ENTITLED

Elements of the Law

Three credits

The functions and problems of tribunals, and the theory of legal rules and of the law crafts. The theory and practice of
American case law, especially in regard to principle, precedent,
statute and justice, are developed with intensive study of selected case materials.'
I suspect that this introduction does not make much of an impression; the entering student lacks the wherewithal to understand the
significance of the words, such as "law crafts" and "precedent,"
used to describe the course.
Students receive their first concrete hint of what lies ahead
when they read The Bramble Bush, by Karl Llewellyn, as part of
a summer assignment before matriculation.3 Llewellyn explains
"the law"-what it is and how it is learned-as only a great master
of legal education can, administering a heavy dose of legal realism
before the student faces the reality of law school. He presents four
assumptions which embody the basic principles of law study, and
which must become ingrained in each student's mind:
(1) The court must decide the dispute that is before it....
(2) The court can decide only the particulardispute which is
before it....
(3) The court can decide the particulardispute only according
to a general rule which covers a whole class of like
disputes....
(4) Everything, everything, everything, big or small, a judge
may say in an opinion, is to be read with primary reference to
the particulardispute, the particularquestion before him.'
1. 56 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI SCHOOL OF LAW BULLETIN 17 (11th ed. Sept. 1982).
2. K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH (1960).
3. A second required book is E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1949).
4. K.

LLEWELLYN,

supra note 2, at 42-43 (emphasis in original), quoted in S. MENT-
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This quote from The Bramble Bush succintly describes the
thrust of the course called Elements of the Law-a course designed
to force the student to be suspicious (if not cynical) of statements
of law presented without accompanying facts, and to lead the student to appreciate the importance of the political, economic, and
social setting to the validity of a legal-opinion. Finally, Elements
trains the student to present both litigated and background facts
to enable a court to understand its role in controlling the litigants'
affairs.
The primary course materials are divided into four sections,
the organization of which reflects their use in the course.' Part I,
Who is Suing Whom for What on What Theory?, begins the legal
education process. It exposes students to the relationship between
procedural and substantive law through the process of legal reasoning, and it allows them to explore the reasons for bringing lawsuits. Part II, Legal Argument: Indefiniteness in New York, illustrates the use and misuse of precedent by counsel and the courts
as they developed a solution to the problem of indefinite contract
terms. (Students often learn more from the blunders of inept counsel than from the brilliance of a skilled lawyer or judge.) Part III,
The Concept at Work, examines the theory and doctrine underlying warranty and products liability law, exposing students to the
collision between the common law and legislative enactments. Part
IV, Foreign Remittances: The Court in Search of a Concept,
shows students how the pressures of fact and the skill of counsel
combine to inform the court of the situation sense, enabling it to
apply the legal analysis of one transaction to totally disparate concepts. This part also demonstrates how the legal process determines which party will bear certain risks in a commercial context.,
These materials and techniques, then, work toward a dual
goal: Teaching the art of legal reasoning and the craft of lawyering,
I. STOTZKY, THE THEORY AND CRAFT OF AMERICAN LAW at xxxiv-xxxv (1981)
[hereinafter cited as THEORY AND CRAFT]. THEORY AND CRAFT is the casebook for the Elements course, authored by Dean Mentschikoff and Professor Stotzky. While Professor Llewellyn's name does not appear on the cover of the casebook, the basic choice of cases was his.
Id. at xvi. Dean Mentachikoff modified Llewellyn's reading list over the years, and Professor
Stotzky added substantial notes, note cases, and questions after the cases. For reviews of
THEORY AND CRAFT, see Gerwin & Shupack, Karl Llewellyn's Legal Method Course: Elements of Law and Its Teaching Materials, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 64 (1983); Jones, Book Review, 37 UNIV. MIAMI L. REV. 867 (1982).
SCHIKOFF &

5. The cases from Part I, which present interesting legal analysis as well as story lines
filled with human interest, are also in J. MICHAEL, THE ELEMENTS OF LEGAL CONTROVERSY
(1948). See Stansbury, Book Review, 1 J. LEGAL EDUC. 607 (1949).

6.

THEORY AND CRAFT,

supra note 4, at xvii-xviii.
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so that a student may develop as a legal advocate, critic, and
theoretician.7
The structure and substance of Elements of the Law is vital to
a contemporary legal education because it provides the student
with the analytic and jurisprudential skills needed to understand
the law as it exists and is practiced. Most importantly, it teaches
that legal reasoning is part of the craft of lawyering, and thus accentuates its importance, while bringing the law to life.
Too often, contemporary law school courses ignore the question of how to "read, dissect and analyze cases" within the context
of each other.' They do not force the student to investigate the
interrelationships between substantive fields of law, between substantive and adjective law, and between case and statutory law.
Rarely do courses address, in any recognizable way, the manner in
which cases are decided and statutes created, or the importance of
the skilled attorney in that process. In these respects, contemporary legal education often fails where other forms of education,
now rejected, succeeded. Elements, especially when supplemented
with a moot court problem, fills this void, establishing its importance in the development of legal education.
III.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF LEGAL EDUCATION

To appreciate the importance of Elements in a curriculum,
one must understand its role relative to the history of legal education, because that history reflects many of the structural aspects
vital to quality legal education. That history divides itself into periods during which one of four forms of teaching predominated: the
apprenticeship periods, the reign of the Inns of Court, the treatise
period, and the modern-or case method-period. Each period
spawned its own method of teaching, with strengths, which Elements attempts to tap, and weaknesses, which Elements seeks to
avoid.
A.

The Apprenticeship Periods

Apprenticeship training is characterized by a pupil (apprentice) learning his profession by working with an experienced practitioner. He learns the skills and knowledge required for the pro7. Id. at xxii. Since its inception, the Elements course also has emphasized the importance of briefing cases in learning to compare and distinguish facts and concepts. The brief-

ing exercise promotes the creative use of case law to support an argument.
8.Id.
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fession through oral and visual instruction, and by mimicking his
master's activities. There is evidence that apprenticeship training
existed as early as the thirteenth century in England;e before the
proliferation of law books,1 it was the dominant form of legal education there. Similarly, because of the scarcity of law books in the
colonies, it was the primary means of educating lawyers in this
country during the colonial period." Further, it experienced a resurgence in England during the latter period," fueled by dissatisfaction with the formal burdens of the theretofore dominant Inns
of Court, and the availability of legal treatises as a means of learning substantive law.' 3 As the Inns of Court declined, appreticeship
training experienced a renewed popularity.
B.

The Inns of Court

Oddly enough, the English Inns of Court arose out of the very
system of apprenticeship that ultimately caused their demise. In
1292, Edward I required judges to take apprentices." These apprentices began to congregate in the inns near the courts because
many of them shared quarters with the senior practitioners who
were directing their studies. 16 Eventually, several inns became devoted wholly to the study of law, housing only senior practitioners
and their apprentices. Thus began the "Inns of Court," which
dominated legal education from the fourteenth to the seventeenth
century.'6
Life for the students at the Inns of Court was highly structured. Those who lived and studied at the Inns belonged to one of
three groups: The senior group, or "benchers," who controlled the
Inn; the "outer barristers;" and finally, the freshman students, or
"inner barristers. '' " Students advanced to senior groups, and
9. 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 314-15 (1923).
10. GLANVILL, TRACTATUS DR LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS REGNI ANGLIE, is the oldest
treatise on Teutonic law; written between 1180 and 1189, it is confined to proceedings in the
King's Court. BRACTON, TREATISE ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND covered the entire law of England as it existed during the Reign of Henry III, which covered the years 1256-1259. J.
AMES, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY 31 (1913).
11. L. HARNO, LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 19 (1953); Stein, The Path of
Legal Educationfrom Edward I to Langdell: A History of InsularReaction, 57 CH.[-]KENT
L. REv. 429, 439-40 (1981).
12. 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 9, at 481 (1927).
13. W. RICHARDSON, A HISTORY OF THE INNS OF COURT 209 (1975).
14. Stein, supra note 11, at 430.
15. W. RICHARDSON, supra note 13, at 2.

16. Id. at 3.
17. Id. at 16-17. Stein describes the three categories of students:
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thereby assured themselves of more perquisites, by demonstrating
competence in legal argument.18
There were three methods of instruction used to sharpen a
student's skills in legal argument: attendance in court, participation in readings, and instructional exercises. Little is known about
student attendance in court and little need be said. During the approximately one hundred days per year when court convened, students had to attend, take notes, and discusss the arguments with
the senior practitioners at the Inn. 19 In all likelihood, actual attendance was spotty, 0 probably approximating that of modern law
students at an unpopular afternoon class; students probably benefited more from the readings and the instructional exercises.
Readings involved a formal process of argument, concentrating
upon the interpretation of parliamentary acts or statutes. Six
months before a scheduled reading period, the benchers would appoint the eldest outer barrister to select and prepare an act for the
reading. 1 On the appointed date, he would read the act to the assembled residents of the Inn, discussing its weaknesses and raising
questions about its application to specific facts. A junior barrister
would then refute the reader's interpretation of the statute and
law; he, in turn, would be followed by other barristers attempting
to refute the reader's other arguments. This discussion usually
22
continued for weeks.

The instructional legal argument exercises, unlike the "more
spectacular" readings,2" required student, rather than outer barrister, involvement. The students propounded and then argued cases
of varying levels of legal difficulty. 2' Depending upon whether the
Experienced students, known as readers, were employed in instruction in somewhat the same manner as contemporary law school teaching assistants. The second category of student, the outer barristers, was perhaps the equivalent of today's second year law school class; their studies were dominated by participation
in the moots. New students, whose course of instruction was largely lecture and
observation, Were denominated inner barristers.
Stein, supra note 11, at 430-31. The benchers, who governed the Inns, had studied and
gained practical experience for twelve to fifteen years before they received the honor of
bench membership. W. RICHARDSON, supra note 13, at 18-19.
18. See W. RICHARDSON, supra note 13, at 17: "The inner barristers were considered
immature until they were competent in the art of legal argument, and able to hold their own
with senior members in house debates."
19. Id. at 98-99.
20. Id. at 100.
21. Id. at 101.
22. Id. at 101-03.
23. Id. at 131.
24. Id. at 131-37.
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argument also involved readers and benchers, the exercise was
called a moot, a bolt, or putting the case."0
Because of the formality of readings and argument exercises,
legal education in the Inns of Court was more effective than apprenticeship training. The readings provided a systematic exposure
to the substance of the law, and the instructional exercises provided systematic training to improve legal analysis and advocacy
skills. The exercises
familiarize[d] students with the rules of pleading practiced in
the national courts at which they were daily auditors, and...
train[ed] them in the technicalities of legal disputation. The frequency of these exercises and the repetitiousness of their arguments, continued over many years, guaranteed a facility in language and rapid rebuttal that could then have been acquired in
no other way.26
The inculcation of these skills is no less vital to the education of
the modern law student and, as will be shown, is furthered by using a moot court problem in the context of an Elements course.
C.

The Treatise Period

Although some scholars referred to the Inns of Court as England's third university, 2" the common law was not a proper educational topic at Oxford or Cambridge until Blackstone's appointment as a lecturer at Oxford in 1753.28 He thereupon tried to
create a system of legal education within the English university
setting. In the initial lecture contained in his Commentaries,
Blackstone decried the then-prevailing method of legal education
by apprenticeship, and proposed university study of the law under
an authority who
should consider his course as a general map of the law, marking
out the shape of the country, its connexions and boundaries, its
25. It is impossible to spell out, in detail, the differences among these legal debates
because there is nothing in the records of the Inns describing their precise nature. They
probably differed in their degree of sophistication rather than in form or procedure. Id. at
131. There was also an argument known as an "imparlance," which questioned a special
aspect of medieval procedure. Id. at 136.
26. Id. at 132-33.
27. Id. at 92.
28. Stein, supra note 11, at 435. Instead, Oxford and Cambridge universities taught
both canon and civil law. "The robed dons of the ancient colleges did not seem to distinguish between theory and profession and saw the common law as a trade unworthy of serious academic consideration." Id.
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greater divisions and principal cities; it is not his business to
describe minutely the subordinate limits, or to fix the longitude
and latitude of every inconsiderable hamlet. . . . These primary
rules and fundamental principles should be weighed and compared with the precepts of the law of nature, and the practice of
other countries; should be explained by reasons, illustrated by
examples, and confirmed by undoubted authorities; their history
should be deduced, their changes and revolutions observed, and
it should be shown how far they are connected with, or have at
any time been affected by, the civil transactions of the
kingdom.2 9
Although Blackstone's attempts were unsuccessful in England,
his efforts did succeed in changing the nature of legal education in
America. His Commentaries was the first major attempt since
0 to reduce the law to
Coke's Institutes"
treatise form; because of
this, it became one of the few books read by Americans training for
the law. It is not surprising, therefore, that American educators, as
well as American institutions, responded to his call to introduce
legal education into the institutional setting: In 1779, William and
Mary College established a chair of law, inviting George Wythe to
fill the position; Columbia appointed James Kent to a professorship in 1793 and again in 1823; Harvard appointed Chief Justice
Isaac Parker of Massachusetts as Royall Professor of Law in 1815;
and the Litchfield Law School was established sometime between
1774 and 1784.31 Thus, legal education planted its roots in American institutions of higher education albeit weakly, in that apprenticeship education prevailed as the predominant means of legal
preparation 2 until the post-revolution era," when a rise in American nationalism and events such as Harvard's 1829 appointment of
Justice Joseph Story as Dane Professor of Law"' made university
legal education more popular.3 '
Legal education in American law schools generally followed
the Blackstone model. From Judge Parker's time until Christopher
Langdell became the dean at Harvard in 1870, professors lectured
29. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *35-36..
30. 1 E. COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND.
31. Stein, supra note 11, at 443.
32. Id. at 439.
33. Id. at 440-41.
34. Id. at 446. The impact of Justice Story on Harvard Law School is similar to Dean
Mentachikoff's influence at the University of Miami School of Law in that the reputation of
each improved his or her school's standing in the academic and professional community.
35. Id. at 440.
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in conjunction with assigned readings, while students took notes.
The Blackstone model emphasized knowledgeable exposition of the
law, rather than skillful discourse.
The treatise and lecture method, which dominated legal education during the nineteenth century, conveyed substance, theory,
and jurisprudence to the students. In these tasks it was superior to
apprenticeships and the Inns of Court. Unfortunately, the treatise
method also suffered from a neglect of analytical or craft skills.
These missing links, especially the lack of training in legal analysis,
brought about the development of a new approach to legal education: the case method.
D. Langdell and the Case Method
In the preface to his first contracts casebook, Langdell explained that he believed the law to be a science, with books as the
experimental record:
Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or
doctrines. To have such a mastery of these as to be able to apply
them with constant facility and certainty to the ever-tangled
skein of human affairs, is what constitutes a true lawyer; and
hence to acquire that mastery should be the business of every
earnest student of law. Each of these doctrines has arrived at its
present state by slow degrees; in other words, it is a growth, extending in many cases through centuries. This growth is to be
traced in the main through a series of cases; and much the
shortest and best, if not the only way of mastering the doctrine
effectually is by studying the cases in which it is embodied."
Langdell employed this philosophy when he compiled his first
casebook-a series of cases in chronological order-which traced
the development of the law of contracts. In the classroom, Langdell
questioned students directly on assigned cases and the law that
those cases expressed or defined.3 7 His students, familiar with the
treatise method, fled in droves.8" A few remained, intrigued by the
intellectual challenge. These became proponents who eventually
brought the Langdell method to the forefront of American legal
36. Id. at 449 (quoting C. LANGDELL, CONTRACTS (1871)).

37. Implicit in the case method was the belief that "we understand most thoroughly,
and remember longest that which we have acquired as a result of labor on our own part."
Keener, The Inductive Method in Legal Education, 28 AM. L. Rsv. 709, 715 (1894).
38. Fessenden, The Rebirth of the HarvardLaw School, 33 HARv. L. REv. 493, 499-503
(1920).
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education."9
The case method has been the dominant form of American legal education for the last hundred years. During that time, law
professors have published a variety of casebooks structured to follow the case method. Casebooks are no longer devoid, however, of
textual summations of the law in the area studied. Indeed, Langdell included a textual summary in the second edition of his
casebook on contracts. Most casebooks, however, have eroded his
method even further, limiting the number of cases on a specific
point, and ignoring the historical background implicit in Langdell's
technique. Other casebook authors continue to depart from the
traditional case method by editing the facts of cases, replacing
them with a summary, or leaving them out altogether; Langdell required a close reading of the full case.
Dialogue within the classroom also has changed. Few
professsors have retained their fidelity to the Socratic method,
often sacrificing Socratic dialogue for lectures on particularly difficult points. Short hypothetical problems often form the basis for
discussion, and some professors have retreated to the strict lecture
method, using the cases only as a backdrop to illustrate the concepts presented. 0
The case method, in its original form, and to a lesser extent, in
its current form, excels as a means of training students in legal
analysis. And while it can be used to convey legal theory and an
understanding of current substantive law, it is less effective at doing so than is the lecture method. Further, both fail to develop the
craft skills cultivated by the apprenticeship and the Inns of Court
techniques, and no legal education is complete until a student has
mastered the sum of these skills. In contrast, Elements, especially
when combined with a moot court problem, recognizes the utility
of these past techniques and taps the best from each of them to
produce an unequaled educational experience.
39. For a more complete history of Langdell and the introduction of his method into
American legal education, see Speziale, Langdell's Concept of Law as Science: The Beginning of Anti-Formalism in American Legal Theory, 5 VT. L. REV. 1 (1980). An interesting
analysis and defense of the case method as compared to other techniques is found in Dente,
A Century of Case Method: An Apologia, 50 WASH. L. REv. 93 (1974). But for an overview
of the first century of American legal education, see McManis, The History of First Century
American Legal Education: A Revisionist Perspective, 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 597 (1981).

40. Professor Beale, a former pupil of Langdell, recalled how Langdell, in his later
years, and as a result of failing sight, "never used the Socratic method in his teaching. He
simply talked, slowly and quietly, stating, explaining, enforcing and reinforcing the principles which he found in the case under discussion." J. AMES, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY
480 (1913).
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IV. THE PLACE OF ELEMENTS OF THE LAW IN THE HISTORY AND
FUTURE OF LEGAL EDUCATION

Elements of the Law is but a logical step in this evolutionary

development of legal education. Its function is not to teach substantive law; most law school courses already accomplish that.
Rather, it seeks to illustrate what law is and how it is formed and

to develop the analytic and professional skills a first-year student
needs to make the most of his legal education. It does so by contrasting the articulated structure of the law with the unarticulated,
and by showing that life situations and social settings structure the
law through the intellectual efforts of attorneys, legislators, and
judges-all of whom play a role in determining the law's content.
Within this general purpose, a number of subsidiary themes
are important to the overall design of the Elements course:
a. Law is a seamless web of related laws and concepts. The

Elements materials, particularly those in Part 1,41 provide an
overview of the legal system. The statutes and decisions weave a
matrix of interrelated rules and concepts, forcing the student to
conclude that no rule of law exists separate and apart from
other, similar rules, and that differences in rules result from a
variety of sources. In this aspect, Elements has much in common
with other legal process courses.
b. Law is the product of development over time. The

unique selection and ordering of the Elements materials also exposes the student to the historical nature of the development of
law. The presentation of Elements materials parallels Langdell's
original casebook. Elements students study cases in chronological order, so that they see the development of doctrine within
the field as the natural result of the case sequencing.4 Since
modern casebooks rarely follow the Langdell pattern, the development over time of a doctrine is no longer so obvious to the
student, requiring its treatment in a separate course.
c. The study of law is an acquired skill. Elements seeks to

influence the way students study law. It articulates a method of
studying and using law which emphasizes analysis. It is designed
to supplement the case method-which, although it was
designed on the premise that the student, investigating the law
under the watchful eye of an able guide, will develop the analyt41. Other purposes for Part I include teaching the student how to read a case-how to
determine the issues and holdings, how to judge the strength of the holding in a case-why
law suits are brought, and the common-law tradition.
42. Langdell emphasized the importance of grasping the historical development of the
law. See supra text accompanying note 36.
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ical skill of the lawyer and thus gain a familiarity with the substantive law, rarely fulfills that premise. Elements fills a void
left by law school courses which convey substantive law and promote general intellectual skills, but neglect the analytical skills
so essential to the lawyer's art.
d. The lawyering craft is an important component in the
growth of the law. Elements also strives to develop the skills
honed by attorneys as they participate in that determination of
the law-skills barely acknowledged in most law school courses.
The sequence of opinions written by Justice Cardozo shows students the influence one man can exercise in the legal community,'3 and inclusion of counsel's arguments in the Elements
materials further illustrates the attorney's effect on the outcome
of cases. The professor can supplement this illustration by discussing the quality of the attorney's advocacy and posing the
question: How could that attorney have improved his argument?
The course begins with cases selected to provide the student
with an overview of the legal system, and the professor with a medium for teaching the basics of reading an appellate decision. The
first case is Butler v. Wolf Sussman, Inc.," an action for replevin
of a ring wrongfully pledged by the owner's husband to the defendant pawnbroker. The defendant pleaded in general denial, the
case was tried, and judgment rendered for the defendant. On appeal, the defendant argued that there was no evidence that the
plaintiff had made a demand for return of the ring before bringing
the action (an element of replevin), and that the defendant's right
to possession was secure under a statute protecting the lien of
pawnbrokers "except where the pledging or possession [of the
pledged item] by the pledger cbnstituted larceny at common
law."' 5 Plaintiff responded that defendant's active defense of the
43. Until Justice Cardozo joined the New York Court of Appeals, that court took a rigid
approach towards indefinite contract terms: "It is elementary in the law that, for the validity of a contract, the promise or the agreement of the parties to it must be certain and
explicit, and that their full intention may be ascertained to a reasonable degree of certainty." United Press v. New York Press Co., 164 N.Y. 406, 410, 58 N.E. 527, 528 (1900).
Cardozo persuaded the court to read commercial contracts with a more realistic eye, and
interpret a contract in its commercial setting. "The law has outgrown its primitive stage of
formalism when the precise word was the sovereign talisman, and every slip was fatal. It
takes a broader view today. A promise may be lacking, and yet the whole writing may be
'instinct with an obligation,' imperfectly expressed." Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222
N.Y. 88, 91, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (1917). Thus, Cardozo's ideas played a key role in developing
the law.
44. 221 Ind. 47, 46 N.E.2d 243 (1943).
45. IND. CODE ANN. § 32 (Burns 1935) (current version at IND. CODE ANN. § 28-7-5-33

(West 1980)).
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case waived the demand requirement and that under these facts,
the statute was either inapplicable or alternatively,
unconstitutional.
During a series of classes, the professor leads the students
through the case using a standard case-brief format. When forced
to articulate the procedure in the trial court below, students begin
to grasp the importance of procedure in reading a case. Stating
the appellate procedure and result subtly compels the student to
concentrate on what the court does rather than on what it says.
When students state the facts of the case, they recognize that the
court does not necessarily organize the facts for the reader, and
that not all the given facts are relevant to the decision. What the
student might have perceived as a relatively straightforward case
takes on added dimensions.
Finally, discussion of Butler v. Wolf Sussman, Inc. turns to
the substantive issues of the case. Analysis usually lasts for several
class periods and serves as a springboard for consideration of the
practical and philosophical aspects of law. The students usually
find three substantive issues. There are, in fact, only two: Whether
the defendant waived a required pre-complaint demand, and
whether the local pawnbrokers act protected the defendant's possession. With a little guidance, students usually state these issues
accurately. The opinion contains a substantial discussion of the defendant's inadequate general denial, however, and its conclusion
that the plaintiff waived the right to a judgment on the pleadings
by proceeding tends to confuse the students. They usually want to
include the adequacy of the general denial as an issue, even though
neither party nor the court below raised the point. This seemingly
minor point allows the professor to distinguish dictum from holding, and to begin a discussion of trial tactics-why did the defendant choose a general denial, and why did the plaintiff consider
moving for a judgment on the pleadings to be unproductive? It
also encourages discussion of the supervisory nature of an appellate court decision.
The first actual issue, the possible demand waiver, generates
discussion of how courts decide what proof is needed before they
grant the requested relief and consideration of the elements of a
cause of action. Since the only cited authorities supporting the
possibility of waiver were intermediate Indiana decisions, out-ofstate appellate decisions, and a reference to Corpus Juris, the professor has a tailormade opportunity to introduce the process of determining the weight of authority. The court's holding-that the
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active defense waived the pre-complaint demand requirement introduces students to the notion that a court can eviscerate a rule
without overruling it.
The second actual issue produces thoughtful instruction in
reading cases and practical illustrations of how the law is formed.
The statutory derivation of the defense at issue exposes the student to the relationship between case law and statutes. In addition,
the express exception in the 1935 statute protecting pawnbrokers
from liability for common-law larceny introduces the student to
the concept of common-law crimes and the unitary nature of marriage at common law. The court's reference to the 1881 Indiana
Married Women's Property Act coupled with an inconclusive discussion of its effect on the interpretation of the language of the
1935 statute leads to classroom discussion of the intricacies of statutory construction. Finally, the court's one-paragraph discussion of
the constitutionality of the statute generates three more areas for
student consideration: first, the relation of federal and state constitutions to the validity of statutes; second, the distinction between
a statute unconstitutional on its face and one unconstitutional as
applied; and third, the unclear nature of the court's reasoning: Was
the statute unconstitutional or was the pawnbroker liable because
of the express exception? The court's blurred rationale adds to the
student's understanding of the leeways of precedent.
The use of Butler v. Wolf Sussman, Inc. thus accomplishes at
least four goals in the classroom: (1) development of case reading
skills, such as determining the case's facts, issues, and holdings,
and recognition of how the procedural or factual posture of the
case limits the holding and its precedential value; (2) understanding of the structure of the legal system; (3) exploration of why attorneys and judges act the way they do; and (4) exposure to the
leeways of precedent.
The cases following Butler continue to add depth to the student's knowledge of the legal system and its structure. For example, Duke of Somerset v. Cookson46 explores the elements of equity
jurisdiction. Subsequent cases trace the elements of ejectment,
compensatory damages, proximate cause in tort, and other areas
that illustrate the limits of a court's power (or willingness) to grant
relief for particular types of alleged wrongs. This is followed by a
series of cases raising questions of justiciability. By the time students complete the first part of the materials, they have a general
46. 3 P. Wins. 390, 24 Eng. Rep. 1114 (Ch. 1735).
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notion of how courts operate and the limits of judicial powers.
Students spend the balance of the course learning how appellate courts decide cases, why they articulate their decisions in a
particular manner, and what the attorney's role is in that process.
Traditionally, this progression through the three sequences of
cases forming Parts II, III, and IV of the materials is steeped in
the Socratic method. In Part II students investigate the development of legal concepts outside the framework of a statute. In Part
III class discussion focuses on the interaction between a court-created legal concept and a subsequent statute. The materials in Part
IV emphasize the attorney's role in educating the court about situations in which the legal concepts arise. For each situation, discussion centers on practical analysis: What the parties want, the reasoning they use, the authority they rely on, the court's decision,
whether the court articulates the law differently than statutes or
prior cases, and the court's ratio decidendi supporting the result
and the rule of law adopted. This type of analysis promotes understanding of a court's decision-making process. Of equal import,
students perceive the attorney's dual role in presenting the facts
and law most effectively for his case, and helping the court to understand the legislative facts to guide its formulation of the law in
that particular case.
V.

THE MODERN MOOT AND ELEMENTS OF THE LAW

When I was a student at the University of Chicago School of
Law, the thought struck me that moot court embodied the practical application of theories I learned in then-Professor Mentschikoff's course, Elements of the Law. Few of my professors, however, attempted to demonstrate the relevance of their classroom
exercises to the practice of law. This attitude has always troubled
me because students seem to learn and remember what they do in
moot court far better than what they do in most classes. Therefore,
when my turn came to teach Elements, it naturally occurred to me
to supplement the standard materials with a moot court record.' 7
47. That I would think in terms of moot court is not surprising. My experience as a
student instructor in the University of Chicago moot court program led me to a serious
consideration of legal education as a career, and to an active involvement in moot court
programs at both of the law schools in which I have taught. See J. GAUBATZ, THE MOOT
COURT BOOK (1979); Gaubatz, Moot Court in the Modern Law School, 31 J. LEGAL EDUC. 87
(1981).
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A Description of the Method

The way I merge moot court with the Elements materials is
simple: When the class is ready to begin discussion of Part II of
the Elements materials, students receive a twenty-page record raising the issues faced by the New York courts in the indefiniteness
cases contained in that Part. They receive a complete record, containing a complaint, an answer, motion papers, a trial court order,
and notice of appeal. The appeal is set in the appellate division
that decided a few of the cases in Part II. Since the New York
Court of Appeals decided the remaining cases in the materials, all
of the cases in Part II provide authority for student argument.
Furthermore, argument before the appellate division requires the
students to recognize that they must use the New York Court of
Appeals' decisions differently than they do those of the court presently considering the students' appeal.
I divide the class into two groups of "law firms" with four to
six students in each "firm"; half of the firms represent the appellant in the hypothetical case, and the other half represent the appellee. These law firms meet and prepare arguments for their client, using only the first case in Part II as their authority. This is
usually an easy task for one side, since the first case strongly supports one position; in fact, the case appears almost hopeless for the
other side. In class, I select students at random to develop their
positions. As students begin to argue, I stress the importance of
knowing the record and the authority upon which they rely. They
must also be able to articulate the holding of that authority in a
way most favorable to their position. This exercise often demonstrates that the court that decided the case may have inaccurately
articulated the rule of law; it also suggests how the facts of a case
limit its authoritative value. The exercises, in turn, suggest arguments the students can employ in subsequent classes.
For the subsequent class session, the students prepare arguments using only the first two cases in Part II for authority. This
requires them to synthesize the decisions in order to develop a rule
of law. One side again appears to have an edge. Successive assignments continue in the same way, with one or more new cases
added to the permissible list of authorities for each class.
Normally, by the fifth class, the weaker of the two sides begins
to find some support for its position in the added authorities. By
the seventh class, students can make a strong argument that the
court has changed its basic approach to the decision of cases in
that area of law. Finally, in the last few class periods, each side of

1983]

LEARNING THE LAW

the case appears to have substantial support in the articulated law,
encouraging students to develop arguments founded in legal policy.
B. The Advantages of Using a Moot Court Problem to Teach
Elements
There are several advantages to using a moot court problem in
's of the Elements materials.
Part II
Most importantly, this method
develops student enthusiasm for the task at hand. Much like the
members of the Inns of Court, students focus upon the importance
of learning professional skills. By acting as lawyers in the hypothetical case, they develop an almost instinctive ability to read
cases with accuracy and creativity, and to articulate the law most
advantageously for their position. Students pursue these goals with
vigor because they understand why the skills are important and
how they will apply to the practice of law. 9
48. I apply the moot court method to Parts II and III of the materials. Although it
could be used with Part IV, I vary my approach to maintain student interest and to maximize student appreciation of the application of Elements to legal practice. In that Part,
Foreign Remittances, I emphasize the use of appellate cases as a source of law for client
counseling purposes. As part of their preparation for those classes, students draft letters of
advice to three hypothetical business clients, each of whom has an interest that will be
affected by the case law on foreign remittances in a different way.
49. Although there is no evidence that Professor Llewellyn ever used a moot court exercise in Elements, he suggested the technique as early as 1948:
And be it observed that the teaching methods required [for teaching craft skills]
are essentially those offered by case-teaching itself, when rightly understood in
contrast to prevailing misunderstanding. For . . .it is not the judicial decision
which is the essence of the "case"; it is instead the concrete problem-raising
situation-so that, as I see it, any introduction of the so-called "problem
method" into law teaching is really but an expansion of the essential merits of
case-teaching, an expansion obscured only by a current mis-emphasis upon the
idea of a "case" as being at best the official report of a judicially decided cause.
Certainly it has been demonstrated that appellate records can become good
"cases"-that appellate advocacy, for instance, can be effectively taught in fairly
large groups with, for example, a set of teams, of four each, at work preparing
the arguments on each side of the issue. There I speak from personal experience. . . .[T]he fact that there are four, or six, or even eight teams at work on a
given side does not at all detract from the effectiveness of discussion and criticism before and by the whole class of one or two briefs taken as samples, using
them as a basis for developing the relevant craft-principles and for testing and
applying them.
Llewellyn, The Current Crisis in Legal Education, 1 J. LEGAL EDUC. 211, 217 (1948) (emphasis in original).
In the same article, Llewellyn distinguished the typical case method of instruction from
his own problem-solving method. He preferred to treat a case "as a problem for solution, not
as a problem already solved." Id. at 213 (emphasis in original). Llewellyn's use of an appellate problem to teach craft-skills in an appellate advocacy class is readily adaptable to teach
craft-skills in a legal process class.
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The moot court method also emphasizes the importance of the
law to the client, recreating a lesson inherent in apprenticeship
training. When students represent an automobile parts retailer,
they understand why the client might want a supply contract
phrased in terms of his "requirements" to be enforceable. In the
clientless classroom, this association is more difficult. The ability
to relate to the client leads to an understanding of the business
needs that created the conflict underlying the case. Once students
recognize these needs, they can appreciate why a court must develop rules ensuring orderly maintenance of the marketplace, along
with resolving the particular conflict. This, in turn, introduces students to legal realism and the attorney's role in educating the
courts to the realities underlying the legal problem. And, as students work with a complete set of pleadings, they gain a comprehensive understanding of the limitations inherent in working with
a record.5"
Finally, the moot court method, much like Langdell's case
method, accentuates changes in the law by forcing the students to
restructure their arguments from class period to class period. The
cases in Part II reveal a shift, both in the judicial approach to deciding cases and in the structure of the law itself. As a result, the
relative strengths of each side of the hypothetical case fluctuate as
cases are added. This movement teaches students the fact and the
nature of change, as well as how to use that change to their
advantage.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Learning-by-doing has been a part of legal education since its
very beginning. Yet, today's legal education is often sorely lacking
in this area. Use of a moot court problem in conjunction with Elements of the Law fills this gap and renews the learning-by-doing
tradition. In early England the goal of the moot was to improve
craft-skills and develop an ability to engage in legal reasoning.
Modern moot court combines the advantages of apprenticeship
training and education at the Inns of Court. 1 By applying these
50. A Harvard law professor has suggested that trial experience would be even better in
this regard. See Shreve, Classroom Litigation in the First Semester of Law School-An
Approach to Teaching Legal Method at Harvard,29 J. LEGAL EDUC. 95 (1977). The appel-

late approach is preferable in the first semester, however, because it allows students to concentrate on analytical skills, without being distracted by litigation's emphasis on interpersonal skills.
51. Langdell's early students formed a club, where the activities included regular per-
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advantages to Elements, a classic case-method course, a student is
offered an unsurpassed opportunity to maximize his education and
develop his practical and analytical skills.52 This unique combination contributes to the formal first year process a practical education in reading and applying appellate cases-an art which will follow the student for the rest of his professional life.

formance in moots, to supplement their studies under him. Fessenden, supra note 38, at
504-05.
52. See J. GAUBATZ, supra note 47, at 1-2.

